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Abstract: Lack of verification is often cited as a root cause of medication errors; however,
medication errors occur in spite of conventional verification practices and it appears that
human factors engineering (HFE) can inform the design of a more effective method. To
this end, an HFE-driven process was designed and implemented in an urban, Midwestern
emergency medical service agency. Medication error data were collected over a 54-month
period, 27 months before and after implementation. A decrease in the average monthly error
rate was realized for all medications administered (49.0%) during the post-intervention time
period. The average monthly error rate for fentanyl, a commonly administered analgesic,
demonstrated a 71.1% error rate decrease. This study is the first to evaluate the effectiveness
of a team-based cross-check process for medication verification to prevent errors in the
prehospital setting.
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Introduction
Across healthcare, organizations are increasingly
focused on improving patient safety. Yet in the
prehospital setting, there is a paucity of information about the safety of care, in spite of the wellknown and documented idiosyncrasies.1–6 One
component of prehospital care that is particularly
understudied, yet highly influential to patient
safety is medication administration.2,3,5,6,7,8 This
paper will discuss the issue of medication errors
in emergency medical services (EMSs), describe a
novel method developed to reduce their frequency, and analyze its effectiveness.
Like many other healthcare providers, paramedics
are taught to verify medications prior to administration using the ‘five rights’.9,10 The five rights of
medication administration require a provider to
mentally confirm that their actions are performed
on the right patient, using the right drug, with the
right dose, via the right route, and at the right time.
Emphasized in textbooks, the five rights are commonly taught and practiced as a one-person set of
mental considerations.10,11–15 Yet, like many
journals.sagepub.com/home/taw

practices in EMSs, the efficacy of the five rights in
preventing errors has never been evaluated or
quantified in any setting.16 Several authors have
questioned the ecological validity of the five rights
as a medication verification process citing that they
more accurately represent goals of safe medication
administration and do not reflect the mental work,
complexity, and context of performing the actual
task.17–22 Interestingly, recommendations are commonly made for additional ‘rights’ to supplement
the original five in an apparent attempt to improve
error sensitivity and refine the process’ ergonomic
application,20,22,23–25 but empirical support is lacking. In spite of these issues, a commonly cited ‘root
cause’ of medication error is lack of verification,
implicitly (and occasionally explicitly) assuming
that proper execution of the verification process
would have prevented them; relegating causal
explanation of error to human failure.26 Although
recommendations for validated features of verification processes have been in existence for some
time,27,28 contemporary approaches to error reduction continue to focus on individual aptitude.29
These improvement efforts (which often take the
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form of remedial education or admonishing individuals to ‘be more careful’) often fail in part
because they do not address sources of error
embedded in processes amenable to sustained
improvement3,30–32 and do not account for the
sociotechnical nature of situated work, both cognitive and physical.33
Using a systems approach informed by human
factors science and extant archival data, providers and managers at Sedgwick County Emergency
Medical Service (SCEMS) developed and implemented a team-based communication protocol
known as the medication administration crosscheck (MACC) which serves as a standardized
method of medication verification to reduce
errors. It was hypothesized that by inserting
another provider into the process of medication
verification and designing error specific traps,
the practice would capitalize on the core components (e.g. mutual performance monitoring and
backup behavior) and coordinating mechanisms
(i.e. closed-loop communication) of teamwork
to create a process that is robust to the errors of
a single provider.34
Methods
Sedgwick County EMS is a medium-sized
municipal ambulance agency serving a population of nearly 500,000 within a 1008 square mile
jurisdiction in the state of Kansas, USA. Because
this investigation analyzed archival data collected by SCEMS to determine the effectiveness
of a quality improvement intervention, a certificate of exemption was granted by the institutional review board.
Self-reporting of medication errors is a compulsory practice at SCEMS and was performed by
electronic means using a centralized system, generally done when crews are at the station after an
error has been identified. Reports are not
anonymized and include a narrative description of
the error in question as well as a patient care report
number for reference. Beyond simply tabulating
frequencies, SCEMS routinely categorizes medication errors according to the following four taxonomies: (1) errors by medication, (2) errors by
type, (3) Reason’s generic error-modelling system
(GEMS), and (4) the National Coordinating
Council for Medication Error Reporting and
Prevention (NCC MERP) index.35 There are limitations with each and there is no universally
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accepted standard for the prehospital setting (for a
review, see Hughes and colleagues),36 which is
why SCEMS leverages all four to inform strategic
improvement initiatives. Since each taxonomy
offers unique information about a single error, all
were considered important to the design and the
evaluation of the MACC’s effectiveness and errors
that might persist after implementation could
inform future process refinements. As such, our
analysis compared pre/post-intervention error
rates within each taxonomy as they are operationalized by SCEMS:
1. ‘Errors by medication’ refers to the tabulation of errors according to the corresponding medication that was administered. In
the event of a wrong drug error, SCEMS
tabulates the error according to that which
the provider intended to give, not the medication that was inadvertently administered.
2. ‘Error type’ consists of distinctions shown
in Table 1. While some of these distinctions
are common descriptions of active errors,
they are by no means universal nor are they
necessarily mutually exclusive. However,
for this study no errors were tabulated as
more than one type.
3. The GEMS taxonomy is a performancebased categorization of behavior as either
skill-based, rule-based, or knowledge-based.
This was first described by Rasmussen and
later refined by Reason.31,33,37,38 Skill-based
errors are designated as errors of action,
such as a slip or lapse, in which the action
executed (or failed to be executed in the case
of a lapse) was not that which was intended.
Rule and knowledge-based errors are considered errors of intent, essentially the execution of a bad plan.29,39 However, the
distinction was made between knowledgebased and rule-based on the grounds that a
provider who executed an appropriate treatment in the wrong way committed a rulebased error. An example of a rule-based
error would be the administration of an
appropriate medication without proper
authorization either by medical protocol or
online medical direction (i.e. direct verbal
contact with a physician). A medication
error was tabulated as a knowledge-based
error when a medication administration was
inappropriate, not indicated, or contraindicated. A dose error could be either skill, rule,
or knowledge-based, and was determined by
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Table 1. Medication error types and examples.
Error type

Example

Incorrect dose (regardless of
appropriateness)

Intended 50 mg, administered 75 mg

Inappropriate situation for
administration/ not indicated

Administration of an antiarrhythmic to a patient in cardiac
arrest with pulseless electrical activity

No order/ not authorized (regardless of
appropriateness)

Appropriate administration of drug, without protocol or online
authorization

Wrong drug

Intended one drug, administered another

Dilution/ preparation error (correct
dosage)

Administered a drug at full concentration when it requires
dilution for clinical reasons

Omission of an appropriate drug

Protocol prescribes a medication that was not given

Inappropriate route (correct dose)

Medication given by a route that is not authorized, for
example, intramuscular versus intravenous

Contraindicated

Medication is explicitly prohibited given clinical presentation,
for example, known allergy

Expired medication

Medication is beyond the labelled expiration date

Incorrect time

Medications that require specific timing which lend to errors,
for example, repeat doses given too soon after initial dose

the information provided within the error
report submitted by the provider.
4. The NCC MERP index was applied to evaluate errors according to the algorithmically
prescribed groups, which is essentially a
severity-of-outcome index.35 NCC MERP
taxonomy definitions are presented in Table
2. It should be noted however, that this
index was not intended for the prehospital
setting; nonetheless, there are no alternatives and the managers of SCEMS find the
information useful for tabulating the outcomes of errors committed.
Intervention
During the first months of 2012, SCEMS undertook the development of an intervention to reduce
the frequency of medication errors committed by its
paramedics. The MACC procedure was designed
to meet the goals of safe medication administration
and was refined through an iterative process of field
evaluation (pilot testing) and feedback to assure
practicality and usability. Because the nature of the
intervention is novel to the prehospital setting and
the information used for its development may be
informative to other agencies seeking to address the

journals.sagepub.com/home/taw

issue of medication errors, a brief description of its
development is provided in Appendix A. Figure 1
depicts the final implemented version of the MACC
evaluated during the study period.
Over the course of a month (March 2012), all fulltime field providers [n = 140; paramedics = 97%,
emergency medical technicians (EMTs) = 3%]
received an online introduction of the intent and
rationale of the standardized procedure as well as
didactic education explaining its execution, followed by lab practice, drawing medications, verifying, and plunging medications into a receptacle.
Timed trials of the procedure in a lab setting averaged 24 s for completion of the verification process.
The MACC was then implemented and codified
into the medical protocols as the official procedure
for verification, to be executed by all providers.
Half-page sized MACC procedure cards were laminated and placed in the ambulance and medication box, and small, plastic identification badge size
copies were given to all providers in the agency.
Modifications to the patient care reporting system
were also made such that any entry of a medication in the flowchart would prompt the two questions depicted in Figure 2.
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Table 2. National coordinating council for medication error reporting and prevention index category definitions.35
Category

Definition

Errors that do not ‘reach’ the patient/ incomplete errors
No error
Category A

Circumstances or events that have the capacity to cause error (i.e. a safety concern).

Error, no harm
Category B

An error occurred but the error did not reach the patient, an ‘error of omission’ does
reach the patient (i.e. a near-miss).

Errors that ‘reach’ the patient/ Completed errors
Error, no harm
Category C

An error occurred that reached the patient, but did not cause patient harm.

Category D

An error occurred that reached the patient and required monitoring to confirm that it
resulted in no harm to the patient and/or required intervention to preclude harm.

Error, harm
Category E

An error occurred that may have contributed to or resulted in temporary harm to the
patient and required intervention.

Category F

An error occurred that may have contributed to or resulted in temporary harm to the
patient and required initial or prolonged hospitalization.

Category G

An error occurred that may have contributed to or resulted in permanent patient harm.

Category H

An error that occurred that required intervention to sustain life.

Error, death
Category I

An error that occurred that may have contributed to or resulted in the patient’s death.

After notification of a near-miss (an email generated
automatically by the patient care reporting system),
an investigation was conducted. Near-miss information was collected and evaluated by the same
taxonomies used for medication errors to provide
insight into the types and nature of errors prevented
by the process, and to inform process modification
or training at the system level. However, since nearmiss data was only collected after implementation,
it is not submitted here for analysis.
Statistical analysis
The absolute and relative frequency of medication
errors (i.e. errors per opportunity) were tabulated
for the entire 54 months study period so as to provide an overall picture of the medication error data,
and then were analyzed separately for the 27 months
pre/post-MACC periods (Tables 3 and 4). A timeframe of 27 months post-implementation was chosen as the endpoint of the evaluation period a priori
4

since this would allow for equal periods of sound,
consistent, and reliable medication error data
before and after implementation. Two-tailed independent samples Student’s t tests were used to
evaluate statistical significance. The change in error
rates within each taxonomy were evaluated in the
same manner. Additionally, the error rate for fentanyl was of particular interest because errors involving this medication were identified a priori as
occurring with higher frequency; and because at
the time the intervention was developed, fentanyl
was the most commonly administered parenteral
medication, it presented the greatest opportunity to
demonstrate improvement.
Results
Sedgwick County EMS responded to 250,416
requests for service during the 54 months study
period, an average of 4637 per month [standard
deviation (SD) = 295]; transporting 169,334
journals.sagepub.com/home/taw
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patients for an average of 3136 per month (SD =
188). It should be noted however, that the general
trend of call volume for the study period was

slightly increasing; the average monthly call volume during the post-MACC period was 7.2%
higher than the pre-MACC period. Further, the
linear trend of the number of medication doses
administered also increased throughout the study
period. Providers administered a total of 73,522
medication doses, 42% of which were parenteral
medications. Medications (both enteral and parenteral) were given on an average of 29.4% of total
calls (SD = 2.8%) or 43.4% of transported patients
(SD = 3.6%). Parenteral medications were given
on an average of 12.4% of total calls (SD = 1.6%)
or 18.2% of transported patients (SD = 2.2%).
Pre/Post-MACC results
Error frequencies and medication dose counts
(i.e. opportunities for error) for the course of the
study period are juxtaposed in Figure 3 and average monthly error rates (errors per opportunity
per month) before and after MACC implementation and are depicted in Figure 4.
A total of 58 errors were recorded pre-MACC for
an average monthly error rate of 0.17% (SD =
0.17%) and 33 errors were recorded post-MACC
for an average monthly error rate of 0.09% (SD =
0.07%), a decrease of 49.0%, p = .01. The overall reduction of error frequency was realized in
spite of a 12.9% increase in the number of medication doses during the post-MACC period.

Figure 1. The medication administration crosscheck© procedure. From The Medication Administration
Cross-Check by P. Misasi, 2013, Wichita-Sedgwick
County EMS System.40 Copyright 2013 by Paul Misasi.
Reprinted with permission.

Errors by medication. Results showed a 71.1%
decrease in the average monthly fentanyl error rate
(pre-MACC: mean = 0.63%, SD = 0.75%; postMACC: mean = 0.18%, SD = 0.35%; p = .004)
contrasted against a 35.1% increase in the number
of fentanyl doses administered in the post-MACC
period. If the number of fentanyl doses and errors

Figure 2. Pop-up dialog box following the entry of a medication in the patient care report. Information of a
near-miss is automatically forwarded to management.

journals.sagepub.com/home/taw
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Table 3. Overall and pre/post-medication administration cross-check error analysis.
Overall

Pre-MACC

Post-MACC

Month count

54

27

27

Responses

250,416

120,503

129,913

7.8%

Transports

169,334

81,599

87,735

7.5%

Medication doses

73,522

34,531

38,991

12.9%

Average monthly doses

1361.5

1278.93

1444.11

12.9%

Enteral medication doses

42,609

20,449

22,160

8.4%

789.1

757.4

820.7

8.4%

30,913

14,082

16,831

19.5%

572.5

521.6

623.4

19.5%

Average monthly doses
Parenteral medication doses
Average monthly doses
Fentanyl doses
Avg. monthly fentanyl doses
Medication error count†

7421

2922

4499

% change

p

54.0%

137.4

108.2

166.6

54.0%

91

58

33

−43.1%

Average number of errors (per month)

1.7

2.2

1.2

−45.5%

Average monthly error rate (all
medications)

0.128%

0.169%

0.086%

−49.0%

.013

Average monthly error rate (fentanyl only)

0.407%

0.632%

0.182%

−71.1%

.004

Average monthly error rate (all meds
excluding fentanyl)

0.100%

0.127%

0.073%

−42.1%

.065

Medication error type rates
Error count†
Incorrect dose administered
Average monthly errors
 Inappropriate situation for
administration/not indicated

50

33

54.2%

44.0%

69.7%

.83
18.1%

.81
28.0%

26.0%

.85

−4.5%

3.0%

−25.0%

.04

−92.9%

6.1%

−3.9%

.28

No order (unauthorized)

8.4%

Average monthly errors

.13

.19

.07

−60.0%

7.2%

8.0%

6.1%

−1.9%

.11

.15

.07

−50.0%

Dilution/ preparation error (correct dose)

6.0%

6.0%

6.1%

0.1%

Omission of appropriate drug

3.61%

4.0%

3.0%

−1.0%

Inappropriate route

1.2%

0.0%

3.0%

3.0%

Contraindicated

1.2%

0.0%

3.0%

3.0%

Average monthly errors

.52

−34.0%

Average monthly errors

Wrong drug

6

83

10.0%

.552

.026

.119

.200

journals.sagepub.com/home/taw
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Table 3. (Continued)
Overall

Pre-MACC

Post-MACC

% change

Expired medication

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

Incorrect time of administration

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

Error count†
Skill-based error
Average monthly errors
Rule-based error
Average monthly errors
Knowledge-based error
Average monthly errors

83

50

33

31.3%

24.0%

42.4%

.48
44.6%
.69
24.1%
.37

.44
42.0%
.78
34.0%
.63

.52
48.5%

p

−34.0%
18.4%
16.7%

.635

6.5%

.59

23.8%

9.1%

−24.9%

.11

−82.4%

.193

.030

NCC MERP index rates††
Error count†
Category C
Average monthly errors
Category D
Average monthly errors

83

50

33

88.0%

92.0%

81.8%

1.38

1.70

1.04

10.8%

8.0%

15.2%

−10.2%
−39.0

.055

7.2%

.17

.15

.19

25.0%

Category E

1.2%

0.0%

3.0%

3.0%

Category F

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

Category G

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

Category H

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

Category I

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

.639

Error rate = frequency/ # months; average monthly error rate = (# errors/ # opportunities to error)/ # months.
†Not all medication errors were able to be appropriately typed due to varying amounts of error information collected in the
first 27 months.
††Information for Category A (safety concerns) and Category B (near-misses) were excluded due to lack of sufficient data.
MACC, medication administration cross-check; NCC MERP, National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting
and Prevention.

are removed from the monthly totals and the pre/
post-MACC monthly error rate change is analyzed
in the same manner, the reduction is still substantial (42.1%) but not significant (p = .065).
Errors by type. Analysis was conducted to assess
any change between the top four pre-MACC
error types: (1) incorrect dose, (2) inappropriate
situation for administration/ not indicated, (3) no
order/ unauthorized, and (4) wrong drug. Only
errors designated as ‘inappropriate situation for
administration/ not indicated’, approached

journals.sagepub.com/home/taw

significance at the p < .025 level with a decrease
of 92.9% (pre-MACC: M = .52, SD = 1.22;
post-MACC: M = .04, SD = .19; p = .027).
Errors by GEMS. In the same manner, analyses
were conducted on changes in the average
monthly errors based on the GEMS taxonomy.
Of the three categories, only knowledge-based
errors approached a statistically significant
decrease of 82.4% at the p < .025 level (preMACC: M = .63, SD = 1.33; post-MACC: M =
.11, SD = .32), p = .03.
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Table 4. Medication errors by medication (entire study period, 54 months). Medications without errors are not
listed.
Medication

Error count

Doses

Overall relative
error frequency

Adenosine

1

396

0.25%

Albuterol

1

7840

0.01%

Amiodarone

1

253

0.40%

Aspirin

1

8619

0.01%

12

2110

0.57%

Calcium chloride

2

78

2.56%

Dextrose

1

3714

0.03%

Epinephrine 1:1,000

2

179

1.12%

Epinephrine 1:10,000

2

7031

0.03%

Fentanyl

27

7421

0.36%

Ketorolac

2

63

3.17%

Labetalol

0

34

0.00%

Lidocaine

11

396

2.78%

1

131

0.76%

11

796

1.38%

Magnesium sulfate

3

109

2.75%

Midazolam

9

685

1.31%

Narcan

2

810

0.25%

NTG

1

18,559

0.01%

Prednisone

1

287

0.35%

Atropine

Lidocaine drip 1G / 250D5W
Lorazepam

NTG = nitroglycerin.

Errors by NCC MERP. Lastly, the average monthly
error rate change for errors categorized using the
NCC MERP index was assessed, however none
of the changes reached the level of statistical
significance.
Discussion
In spite of the difficult and debatable nature of
quantifying errors, let alone assessing the effect of
an intervention on those errors, the MACC shows
potential as an important component in the effort
to reduce medication errors committed in the
prehospital setting. Notwithstanding limitations
described below, this study is the first of its kind.
8

Additionally, the implications of these findings
may well extend to other areas of healthcare
whose providers utilize unproven methods for
verifying medication accuracy or work in less controlled and less technologically sophisticated settings. A 49% monthly error rate decrease over a
substantial time period was demonstrated, with
particular success (71% monthly error rate reduction) in the administration of a commonly used
analgesic in the prehospital setting. Thus, the
MACC appears to be successful in achieving the
purpose of medication error reduction.
Conventional methods of verification as commonly taught and practiced rely on the mind that
journals.sagepub.com/home/taw
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Figure 3. Frequency of medication errors (measured on the primary axis) per month during the study period
compared against the opportunities to error (doses administered); measured on the secondary axis.

Figure 4. Reduction in average monthly error rates.
*Indicates p < .025.

produced an error to also prevent it, which is a
brittle strategy to assure patient safety.10 Whereas
the MACC was designed with the presumption of
human fallibility, not the expectation of perfection. There is simply too much variability with
mental verification processes to solely rely on the
mental processes of a single provider for safe
medication administration. The nature of achieving expertise in any field results in the reduced
amount of consciously directed cognitive effort
devoted to a task41,42; in other words, less ‘thinking’ is involved. Thus, admonishing providers to
think really hard, be really careful, or double or
triple-check, especially when they have performed
the task hundreds, if not thousands of times, is
journals.sagepub.com/home/taw

diametrical to the nature of the cognitive task.29
Morrow, North and Wickens43 described that
preventing the majority of medication errors does
not require a re-doubled effort of concentration,
but a carefully designed and guided interruption
of automatized behavior.44 Although there are
multiple scientifically sound recommendations in
the literature that argue for reducing the load on
working memory,28,43,45 the prehospital setting
has yet to strategically and systematically adopt
many of these practices, despite the vulnerabilities imposed by stressful situations, time compression, and the unique context in which care is
delivered.36,46 Thus, the MACC likely achieves
error sensitivity by requiring communication
9
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between providers. Not only does the cross-check
serve to interrupt the automaticity of the process
of giving a medication, it also slows the process
enough for attention to focus on behavior because
cross-checking is cognitively effortful, requiring a
reconceptualization of the task.47
Another reason the MACC may have demonstrated a significant reduction in medication
errors could also be due to the insertion of
another provider as an additional barrier of
defense, a ‘defenses-in-depth’ strategy,31 which
adds redundancy and resilience into the process.
In other words, part of the system can fail, but
does not result in total system failure. The reduction of knowledge-based errors (82.4%) lends
itself as a demonstration of this effect; by bringing the knowledge of the additional provider to
bear, errors were likely corrected and averted, a
phenomenon described in the teamwork literature.34 Given the design of the MACC, in order
for a medication error to reach the patient it must
penetrate the knowledge and abilities of two
providers.
Although not all errors were prevented after
implementation of the cross-check, analysis of
these errors has proven quite informative.
Investigations identified that in these cases, the
MACC was not used as designed or at all, which
was expected. Paramedicine has traditionally
been practiced individualistically rather than
team-based, so adapting to a team-based medication verification process may require a shift in
providers’ mindset. More importantly, when
errors occurred despite the MACC, they were
identified as knowledge-based or rule-based
errors committed by two providers simultaneously, which suggests system-level education or
training may be necessary (as opposed to individual remediation) or the redesign of decision support systems such as protocols or the introduction
of cognitive aids such as dosing references may be
warranted.
The MACC also leverages the short and long-term
benefits of collaborative cross-checking, teamwork, and communication, which have been realized in other domains such as aviation. Teamwork
has been shown to improve performance by as
much as 20%48 and Patterson and colleagues47 and
Freund and colleagues49 detail many of the benefits of cross-checking. This could be of great benefit at a low cost; the MACC can be learned and
utilized relatively quickly, and for the cost of
10

printing off a card for each provider within the
organization. Given the data presented, we believe
that this could be a very beneficial intervention in
regard to patient safety. The MACC was developed with good team practice and communication
skills in mind and should enhance teamwork
between providers while handling the complexity
of administering medications.
Limitations
There are some limitations to bear in mind in
review of these results. First, the study lacks a
nonequivalent control group to compare respective amounts of change in prevailing and resultant
error rates over time. Therefore, to improve the
generalizability of the results and lend convergent
validity, a multi-site or multi-group quasi-experimental design comparing the MACC with other
methods of medication verification are recommended.50,51 Other variables such as the managerial efforts to develop a culture of safety as well as
incorporate so called ‘just culture’ philosophies
(whereby human error is explicitly managed in a
nonpunitive fashion) may also have played a role
across the latter half of the study period; although
it could be argued that this would have increased
the number of errors reported, in spite of which
our results demonstrate a reduction. Inherent difficulties in assessing the true number of medication errors are well known,2,3,5,6,25 especially since
most errors are self-reported and direct field
observation is not practical.6 The most common
errors (by medication) identified in this study
were controlled substances, which require strict
control and reconciliation processes not common
to all medications administered; so it should not
necessarily be inferred that administration of narcotics are particularly troublesome or error prone.
Also, just like any cognitive aid, compliance and
complacency can become a problem as individuals become used to using the tool over time.
Lastly, the formulary of medications was not consistent across the entire study, some were added,
and some were removed at various times. For
example, midazolam was inserted into the formulary during the 32nd month; the last dose of
lorazepam was administered during the 33rd
month. It should be noted however that fentanyl
was a part of the formulary for the entire 54-month
duration of the study.
Other potential threats to internal validity such as
history, maturation, statistical regression to the
mean, and the Hawthorne effect should be
journals.sagepub.com/home/taw
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considered. History threats could have been other
incidents or interventions taking place throughout the MACC training period that led to the
change in the outcome, although this seems
unlikely because no other interventions at the
time were focused on medication errors.
Maturation effects could be due to overall safety
culture growth in the organization. Regression to
the mean could have led to the decrease in medication errors across time, but the significant drop
in errors after the intervention provides evidence
against this. Finally, the nature of the study was
salient to the participants, which could affect their
performance through the Hawthorne effect,
although the long time span of this study makes
Hawthorne effects unlikely.
In addition to addressing the issues enumerated
above with additional research, some interesting
and organic developments to the process should
be evaluated. Since the end of the study period,
SCEMS field providers developed a pocket-sized
‘contraindications card’ as a cognitive aide and to
improve EMT’s engagement in the verification
process. Another avenue of research that should
be explored is the addition of dosing references
(e.g. paper or electronic).
Also, an assessment of ‘near-misses’ was not conducted until after MACC implementation and
are therefore not reported here. Thus, an additional site investigation into the effectiveness of
the MACC would do well to include this variable
into the analysis before implementation.
Lastly, to date there is no universally accepted definition of a medication error in the prehospital setting nor a taxonomy for their classification, and
those that do exist are an extension from the hospital setting and have limitations in terms of applicability. For example, this study considered a dose
error to be any dose other than that which was prescribed (i.e. exact measurement), while other studies offer as much as a 20% margin.52 Furthermore,
the taxonomies utilized in this study describe active
errors and provide insight into the technical nature
of the error, but do not consider the antecedents or
latent factors that may contribute to error production.31,36 Hughes and colleagues have proposed a
taxonomy adapting the human factors analysis and
classification system (HFACS) following a systematic review of medication error in EMS literature.36
The usefulness of this taxonomy has yet to be demonstrated with field data but is worth exploring
since this would likely assist in the targeting of
journals.sagepub.com/home/taw

intervention efforts that do not simply focus on
individual competence.
Conclusion
The MACC was designed to capitalize on the
benefits of teamwork and collaborative crosschecking. Notwithstanding the limitations of this
study, it is the first step toward an empirically
validated method of medication verification to
reduce errors.
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Appendix A
Development of the MACC
Overall, four sources of information were used to
support development and design elements of the
MACC: (1) archival agency data on medication
error frequency and analysis, (2) observational data
recorded from a credentialing evaluation process
(i.e. simulated patient scenarios) of paramedics, (3)
data from an internal agency survey that assessed
prevailing methods of verification, and (4) tenets
and practices established in human factors science,
such as teamwork (particularly closed-loop communication), collaborative cross-checking, and the
use of cognitive artifacts; additional information
regarding the last three is provided below.
A.1. Observations from the credentialing process. In 2011, the Wichita-Sedgwick County
EMS System’s Office of the Medical Director
instituted a provider credentialing process to
assure continued competency. In addition to a
written exam, case review, and interview with the
medical director, providers were required to complete one randomly selected, medical call simulation in the lab and one cardiac arrest simulation
(both video recorded for post hoc analysis). Of
those evaluated, 31% committed a medication
error that they were not aware of during the cardiac arrest simulation; most which were identified
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as dosing/skill-based errors whereby the provider
intended to administer the correct dose (i.e. verbalized the correct dose) but delivered an incorrect dose. The information gleaned from this
process suggested that a verification process that
relies on one person may be a brittle strategy.
A.2. Agency medication administration methods
survey. Information about the prevailing methods of medication verification and self-reported
errors were collected by way of internal agency
survey. A total of 107 of the 140 full-time field
paramedics completed the survey in early 2012
for a response rate of 71.3%. One-hundred percent of respondents indicated that they perform a
verification process prior to medication administration; 77% of whom stated they use the five
rights method and the remaining indicated they
verify by other means. Of these providers, 60%
stated that they had committed a medication
error in their career. This information reinforced
the conclusions made by Grissinger9 and others
that healthcare providers believe that they do verify appropriately using the five rights and yet still
commit medication errors. Combined with the
findings from error data and credentialing observation, the question of how to prevent someone
from making a medication error, changed to one
of whether it was possible for someone to prevent
themselves from doing something they believed to
be correct, as the common practice of the five
rights would suggest.
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A.3. MACC design considerations derived from
human factors. The MACC was designed to
‘catch’ errors in production, including errors of
dose, route, rate, contraindications, preparation
(i.e. dilution/ concentration) and wrong drug
administration. It was developed assuming providers are vulnerable to errors of action, i.e. a slip
or lapse, and assumed local rationality.53 Given
the prevalence of errors identified as dosing slips
unbeknownst to those who committed them, and
despite their belief of positive, correct verification,
the MACC designers concluded that any effort to
prevent errors would require another provider.
Freund and colleagues27 identified that one of
only two key factors associated with reduced
adverse events in the emergency department
was the involvement of an additional physician.27

In the prehospital setting, this is feasible because
care is typically delivered in teams of dyads.6
Steps to assure closed-loop communication and
visual verification were also designed into the process. Further, the MACC requires the provider
administering the medication to verbalize why a
drug is being given, thereby explicitly communicating intent and rationale, which serves to make the
provider’s mental model explicit (i.e. the patient’s
condition and need for a particular therapy). This
was thought to improve the quality of the team’s
shared mental model that has been shown to result
in higher quality decision making in teams.34 The
cross-check sequence requires concurrence from a
verifier to proceed. In the event that disagreement
occurs, or a reason that should preclude administration becomes known, the process must either be
discontinued or corrections made; thereafter the
process is repeated from the beginning.
Ultimately, the MACC creates a situation where
the verifier must authorize the administration of a
medication; and although designers anticipated
the cross-check would not prevent all medication
errors, the arrangement of a second provider’s
concurrence creates two conditions worthy of
consideration: (1) a situation whereby errors are
informative beyond the deficiencies of a single
provider (suggesting that a higher system-level
issue may need addressed), and (2) team-level
accountability for the safe and correct administration of medications to patients.
Lastly, designers understood that the process would
be utilized by and with team members of lowerlevel certification than paramedics, for example,
basic-level EMTs. The designers theorized that
although this situation may jeopardize the sensitivity of the process, many of the engineered benefits
of the process would be retained: (1) an EMT can
still visually inspect that the drug prepared is the
drug intended, (2) an EMT can confirm that the
volume or quantity prepared corresponds with
what was articulated, (3) the brief time it takes to
execute the process serves as a ‘pause point,’ and
(4) by requiring a provider to vocalize their intent,
they are more likely to prevent their own errors,
even when alone (e.g. during transport), similar to
that of a proofreading process.
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